transaction cost economics has frequently been employed to analyze the boundaries of the firm, traditional specific investments in physical assets are largely absent in IT services and many of the other project-based industries that are experiencing a rise in the use of independent contractors. Following Gulati and Singh (1998) we examine the impact of appropriability concerns and the degree of interdependence among workers from the focal firm and workers from other firms, and show that both lead to a preference for employees. In addition, we draw upon agency theory (Holmstrom, 1979) to show that increases in the cost of verifying project quality also lead to a preference for employees. We argue that projects that are aligned based on these predictions will be more profitable than those that are misaligned.
Previous studies of independent contractors examine how the use of temporary workers may benefit employees by increasing their job security and mobility and/or serving as a buffer when revenues decline (Barnett and Miner, 1992) , how the use of temporary workers varies by firm and industry level factors (Mangum, Mayall, and Nelson, 1985) and the level of unionization (Abraham, 1988; Gramm and Schnell, 2001) , and how the use of temporary workers provides flexibility (Kalleberg, 2000) especially in rapidly changing technological environments (Carnoy, Castells, and Benner, 1997) . Other studies show that the use of temporary workers provides cost savings (Houseman, 2001) , avoids both legal obligations related to full-time employment and unionization (Kochan, Smith, Wells, and Rebitzer, 1994) , and increases a firm's product offerings without a large fixed investment in labor (Lazerson, 1988) . On a more strategic note, research shows that firms use employees for core functions that are key elements of their competitive advantage and use contractors for peripheral areas (Deavers, 1997; Slaughter and Ang, 1996) . Although Davis-Blake and Uzzi (1993) develop task-level predictions about bureaucratization and complexity and the use of contract workers, they offer no empirical analysis of independent contractors at the project level. In sum, these studies attest to the increasing use of independent contractors but provide little theoretical or empirical analysis of the use of independent contractors at the project level. Thus, we continue to know little about why any particular task might be assigned to an independent contractor instead of an employee.
We also know little about the performance implications of this choice. Previous studies examine the link between the use of contractors and innovation (Matusik and Hill, 1998; Storey et al, 2002) , and between employment status and job outcomes such as commitment or satisfaction (Feldman, 1990; Pearce, 1993; Allen and Sienko, 1997; Marchese and Ryan, 2001) . Nonetheless, only one study (Jarmon, Paulson, and Rabne, 1998) examines the performance implications of using contractors versus employees. It finds that the performance of both types of employment relation is roughly equivalent; however, performance is based on an aggregate measure of perceived performance using survey responses about an individual's effort, attendance, and other subjectively measured variables. Performance was not measured for specific tasks or in specific situations. To date, no study links an analysis of costs and benefits, such as profitability, with the choice between staffing a task with independent contractors versus employees.
We use a newly constructed data set from the IT service industry to examine the performance implications of employment relation choice at the project level. Our data consist of 192 projects of a large IT services firm (hereafter fictitiously known as Compustar) in Silicon Valley, and includes a variety of transaction attributes, measures of Compustar's relative capabilities, choice of employment relation, and profitability for each project. Thus, this data allows us to empirically examine the antecedents and performance implications of contracting for knowledge workers for a variety of tasks and in the presence of three different sources of contracting difficulties.
Our analysis shows that projects that use independent contractors despite the presence of contracting difficulties arising from expropriation concerns, measurement costs, or interdependence, experience lower performance than projects that use employees.
Conversely, using independent contractors leads to higher profitability than using employees when projects are not subject to these contracting difficulties. Such misalignment leads to lower profitability, with the magnitude of the effect depending on type of contractual difficulty and type of misalignment. This paper makes three contributions to the fields of organization theory and strategy.
First, the paper provides the first direct empirical evaluation of the profitability of using independent contractors versus employees for a variety of knowledge-intensive tasks.
Independent contractors generally provide superior performance, except in the presence of contracting difficulties arising from expropriation, measurement cost, and interdependence. Second, we are able to undertake the first direct test of TCE's alignment-profitability hypothesis with the transaction as the unit of analysis. Although researchers identify more than 600 empirical papers examining TCE predictions (Boerner and Macher, 2001) , no study directly links alignment to profitability at the transaction level. Some critics of TCE (e.g., Gulati, 1999; Winter, 1990) argue that the lack of research on this alignment-performance relationship is a severe shortcoming of the TCE literature, which limits the theory's usefulness. Our results show that TCE does have important performance implications. Third, the paper illustrates that TCE may be as useful for understanding organizational choice and performance in knowledge-intensive high-technology industries as it is for asset-intensive lowtechnology industries. Whereas the vast majority of empirical transaction cost research has come from "old economy" industries, our empirical context is clearly part of the "new economy" that relies heavily on knowledge instead of physical assets, is rapidly growing, and constantly confronts technological change.
The hypotheses are developed in the context of the information technology services industry in the next section. We then describe statistical methods, data, and variables, which are followed by the results, discussion and conclusion.
EMPIRICAL CONTEXT AND THEORY
IT service suppliers perform a variety of services for their customers that include, but are not limited to, designing customized software systems, updating and maintaining existing software or hardware systems, migrating data among various hardware platforms, and assisting with network design and security. Customers typically identify individual IT projects and then secure resources to independently complete each project. For instance, a customer may engage IBM for one project and Hitachi for another. Thus, each project represents a separate and distinct transaction. IT service suppliers satisfy project requirements either with their employees (insourcing) or by outsourcing the project to independent contractors. The sourcing decision is particularly important because the members of the project team typically work directly with the customer and, in general, work is performed at the customer's site-features of the exchange that can give rise to contracting difficulties. (Such difficulties in the contracting literature are known as contracting hazards. We use the terms difficulties and hazards interchangeably.) Unlike other industries for which physical asset specificity is a source of the principal contracting hazard, central contractual hazards in the IT industry are related to expropriation, measurement cost, and interdependence.
Expropriation concerns (Pisano, 1990; Oxley, 1997; Gulati and Singh, 1998) influence transaction costs because valuable intellectual property may be expropriated without appropriate safeguards. While others have referred to this issue as appropriability concerns, we employ the term expropriation to focus on the potential for losing sole rights to a rent-generating asset. The IT industry contains many valuable and proprietary technologies for which patents and trade secret law offer imperfect protection (Shapiro and Varian, 1999) . Since an IT supplier's proprietary technology must be transferred to those engaged in providing the service to customers, those individuals with the technological knowledge may have an opportunity to expropriate the technology and re-use it without the IT supplier's approval or knowledge. Such opportunistic behavior imposes substantial opportunity costs on the IT supplier, which encourages an IT supplier to safeguard against expropriation.
The cost of safeguarding against expropriation differs by the choice of employment relation. Although the administrative apparatus of bureaucracy is costly to set-up and operate, we argue that insourcing offers a more effective safeguard than that available through independent contractors when the opportunity cost of expropriation is great; otherwise, outsourcing is less expensive than integration because it substantially avoids such administrative costs. The bureaucracy within firms helps make it easier to control employees (Bills, 1987) but is not likely to help control independent contractors. One such administrative mechanism is an internal labor market (Baron, Davis-Blake and Bielby, 1986) , which can be used to select workers who will follow the firm's rules (Cohen and Pfeffer, 1986) and provide opportunities for employees (DiPrete, 1987) , but not independent contractors. For instance, as mentioned above, once a particular piece of technological knowledge has been transferred to the recipient, she may re-use it with other customers. However, the recipient's incentive to expropriate is much less for an employee than for an independent contractor. Independent contractors typically can redeploy expropriated technology at low cost because they usually have a critical complementary asset-an existing network of customers to whom they could attempt to sell the technology. In addition, employees have a stronger identity with or allegiance to the firm due to the level of socialization (Chatman, 1991) . While employees could expropriate technology, independent contractors pose a relative greater threat to the firm. Realizing this contracting difficulty, the IT supplier has an incentive to engage in costly monitoring and limit access to only those pieces of proprietary knowledge necessary for providing the service when using an independent contractor. Employees, in contrast, do not possess an existing network of customers and face higher uncertainty and greater costs in finding customers for the technology, which attenuates their incentive to expropriate compared to independent contractors. Also, employees have a fiduciary duty to their employers and often sign employment contracts that place restrictions on their activities after leaving the firm (Masten, 1993) .
While such contracts are sometimes difficult to enforce, defending employer-filed lawsuits represents additional costs and uncertainty for employees who might be tempted to expropriate proprietary technology. Socialization among employees and the building of loyalty between employees and the organization (Chatman, 1991; O'Reilly and Chatman, 1996) add further impediments to employee expropriation by creating a bond between the employee and the firm. Finally, training an individual to use a firm's proprietary technology is an example of firm-specific learning. Firms can amortize the cost of firm-specific training over the time the employee is with the firm (Williamson, 1981) . Thus the cost of repeatedly training contractors may pose a cost disadvantage for the firm in addition to posing an expropriation hazard. We therefore hypothesize: H1: Insourcing supplants outsourcing as expropriation concerns about an IT service provider's proprietary technology increases.
Measurement costs of the quality of an IT project's output make it difficult to link effort with outcome, which increases the likelihood of a moral hazard (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Holmstrom, 1979) . While testing software and hardware may quickly reveal output quality for some projects such as data migration, equipment installation, and standalone software applications, verifying quality can be difficult and costly if not impossible for other projects. For example, assessing the quality of upgrading a network; designing a complex, integrated software application; or designing networks or applications to accommodate future expansion is difficult. The complexity of these projects makes it costly to fully verify system functionality or to verify that the system is designed to minimize the cost of future upgrades. For instance, programmers can take short cuts to minimize the cost of a current project but, by doing so, increase the cost of future upgrades. The architecture created by the programmer, much like the foundation of a house, can be built to readily accept expansion or to just support the current requirements. An unscrupulous developer could use inferior grade concrete or pour the foundation too thin-both of these problems would typically not be immediately visible upon a latter stage inspection. Likewise with a software program, the programmer can either build a full foundation to accept upgrades and some level of disruption, or he can implement a less developed architecture that will have to be modified later to accept upgrades and/or additional traffic.
The IT service provider has an incentive to maintain its reputation with customers because of the prospects of repeat business, which creates a desire to supply quality output. As with the expropriation hazard, the likelihood of shirking differs by employment relation. In addition to the cost and benefits of employees and independent contractors described above, we highlight here that insourcing, in contrast to outsourcing, provides a set of weaker incentives that attenuate moral hazard and hence reduce the need to engage in costly monitoring. Independent contractors have high-powered incentives as they are only paid if the job is successfully completed, which implies that they will complete the project as quickly and as inexpensively as possible and thus have incentives to eliminate any costs that cannot be readily observed by the customer. Such high-powered incentives when verification of effort is costly have been found to increase likelihood of shirking by independent contractors (Anderson, 1985; Anderson and Schmittlein, 1984) .
In contrast, employees are less likely to shirk because of weaker pecuniary incentives to do so and because there is a threat of diminished promotion possibilities should shirking eventually be discovered (Williamson 1991) . Firms also actively recruit employees who fit the organization and are more likely to follow the organization's rules and norms (Cohen and Pfeffer, 1986) . Many IT firms, including Compustar, have fired employees as a result of low quality work associated with poor system functionality and with failure to design the IT system to ease future upgrades, which makes the threat of dismissal credible. Low-powered incentives facilitate employee effort being guided by administrative controls that include documented processes and procedures to ensure high-quality design, documentation, and implementation; verification of training; socialization into the design standards of the firm; and self-regulation by peers and managers. Thus, insourcing, while costly because of these bureaucratic processes, reduces the likelihood of shirking and the attendant need for verification. We therefore hypothesize:
H2: Insourcing supplants outsourcing as the cost to verify project quality increases.
While interdependence impacts the formation of ties between firms (Pfeffer and Nowak, 1976; Gulati, 1995) , it also impacts organizational form (Gulati and Singh, 1998) .
Interdependencies among IT projects give rise to a third type of contracting difficulty because they lead to bilateral dependency among IT suppliers. Customers, for a variety of reasons, may segment one large project into a set of subprojects and contract with different IT service suppliers for each module (or assign some modules to various IT suppliers and others to their own employees). Such segmentation may arise because the size of the project requires more resources than the firm or any particular supplier currently has available or because the project requires a greater variety of skills than any single firm possesses. For instance, the rise of client/server technology led to a greater integration of these decentralized systems, typically based on Unix or Windows NT, with traditional mainframes in the data center that typically ran proprietary systems such as IBM's OS/390. Such integration projects usually require a diverse array of hardware and software skills that are rarely found in a single firm.
Although segmentation offers the buyer access to world-class capabilities in a variety of technological areas, it creates a bilateral dependency problem for the various suppliers because such projects often involve leading edge technology, for which standard interfaces have not been developed, and their interaction involves much uncertainty.
Such a condition is consistent with Thompson's (1967) concept of reciprocal interdependence and with Gulati and Singh, who state that "the primary concerns from interdependence are the administrative challenges of coordinating tasks between partners" (1998: 785). Technological diversity and uncertainty make it costly, if not impossible, to fully specify system functionality and module interfaces in a contract.
Such interdependencies thus increase the degree to which contracts are incomplete as well as the need for adjustments among IT suppliers as they reduce the uncertainty of how diverse technologies can work together to achieve the desired functionality over the duration of the project.
Unfortunately, interdependencies also make verification of the effort to mutually adjust difficult since the performance of one module depends on another, which creates an incentive to strategically shift costs from one IT supplier to another. For instance, if there is more than one way to adapt to an unexpected interface problem, which is almost always the case, then the groups in charge of the affected modules are likely to prefer solutions that require others to make the necessary changes to accommodate the innovation. Insourcing is an effective response to the type of coordination problem that arises from interdependence for a variety of reasons, including creating a shared vision and motivating employees to work together (Barnard, 1938; Thompson, 1967; Blau, 1972) . Outsourcing poses problems when confronted with this type of coordination problem because of the lack of structure and systems compared to that which exists within the firm (Litwak and Hylton, 1962) .
Interdependencies give an independent contractor the opportunity to strategically shift costs to the customer or another supplier. This is particularly problematic when, as is the case in IT, relational governance is unavailable to curb the incentive to do so because opportunities for repeat business between the firm and the independent contractor are uncertain. Such cost shifting increases conflict among IT suppliers and the customer, which leads to higher costs. Employees, on the other hand, have incentives more aligned with their employer to continue the employer's relationship with its customers, many of which arise from the socialization of employees and organizational culture (Chatman, 1991) . We therefore hypothesize:
H3: Insourcing supplants outsourcing as the degree of interdependence between personnel from the IT supplier and personnel from another supplier or the customer increases.
These three hypotheses predict an alignment between three attributes of an IT project and whether the project is staffed with employees (insourcing) or independent contractors (outsourcing). In discussing the performance impacts of misalignment, Williamson (1985: 22-23) predicts that misalignment leads to higher costs and therefore inferior performance relative to transactions that are aligned. Several studies provide partial tests of this alignment/performance relationship. For instance, Armour and Teece (1978) found that the M-form organization led to higher performance for managing diversified oil firms than the centralized form. Walker and Poppo (1991) found that alignment led to lower comparative negotiation costs for a large manufacturing corporation. Masten, Meehan and Snyder (1991) found that management costs in ship construction were lower when transaction attributes and organizational forms were aligned. Silverman et al. (1997) and Nickerson and Silverman (2001) found that misalignment of the annual aggregate labor-market transaction in trucking lowered carrier profitability and increased carrier failure rates.
Each of the three hazards outlined above generates additional costs for the transaction if it is misaligned (i.e., attributes of the transaction are not matched with the organizational form as predicted by TCE). When proprietary technologies are involved, using independent contractors is likely to result in additional costs from training and safeguarding the technology against expropriation. Measurement difficulty is likely to result in greater monitoring costs in order to verify quality and prevent project disruptions when independent contractors are employed. Interdependencies are likely to lead to a loss in reputational capital and higher dispute resolution costs when using independent contractors. In all three cases when hazards are present, using employees offers greater profits than using independent contractors. Socialization and organizational culture also are important elements of how firms can perform such projects more efficiently than independent contractors. Investments in socialization and organizational culture spread to employees within the organization.
Culture helps direct the actions and attitudes of employees, regardless of whether or not the project poses appropriability, shirking or interdependency hazards. Thus, the cost of using employees will not vary with the presence of contractual hazards. However, additional controls will have to be put in place or additional effort will have to be spent trying to socialize independent contractors into the organization or find other means of controlling them when contracting difficulties are present in order to decrease the incentives for the contractor to act opportunistically. The cost of using independent contractors thus will increase as the contracting difficulties increase.
Therefore, independent contractors are less expensive than employees when no contracting difficulty is present because the independent contractor will have a high level of incentive intensity, which produces a higher level of productivity than employees and avoids the bureaucratic cost of the IT supplier's administrative apparatus. Hence, H4: Projects that are aligned based on hypotheses 1, 2, and 3, will be more profitable than those that are misaligned.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Methods. The challenge for our statistical analysis is to evaluate the profitability of one mode of organization compared to another mode for the same set of project attributes.
An estimation problem arises because the choice of governance is likely to be chosen systematically, not randomly, which implies that a simple OLS of performance as a function of organization mode leads to biased estimates (for a discussion see Masten, 1996; Hamilton and Nickerson, 2003) . The use of interaction terms also leads to biased estimates. Such estimation problems have become known as models with selfselection or treatment effects. The now standard approach for correcting for such treatment effects is a switching regression model (see for example, Madalla, 1983, Chapter 9, and Greene, 1997,Chapter 20) . Hamilton and Nickerson (2003) Where X i are independent covariates that influence mode choice, β' is a vector of coefficients, u i is distributed normally, S i * is a latent measure of governance, S i = 0 corresponds to outsourcing and S i = 1 corresponds to insourcing. The second stage analyzes performance, profitability in our case, conditioned on the choice of organizing mode. So, profitability for outsourced and insourced projects, respectively, takes the form:
where π 1 and π 2 are profit for projects organized as outsourced and insourced, respectively; W i is the reduced form vector of exogenous covariates; and γ is a vector of coefficients. Note that W i and X i are identical except for instruments in X i to econometrically identify Eq. (1) that are not included in W i . While the nonlinearly of the Probit models is sufficient to identify the equation in the second stage, it is generally preferred to use at least one instrument to identify the equation. Assuming that π 1 and π 2 are jointly distributed, Eqs. (2) and (3) become:
where φ(·) is the density function and Φ(·) is the distribution function of the standard normal, and σ 1 and σ 2 are coefficients. While all observations are used to estimate Eq.
(1), only those observations that are outsourced or insourced are used for estimating Eqs. (4) and (5) We randomly selected a sample of 192 projects from Compustar's accounting system.
We subsequently pulled the corresponding contracts from the contracts library. Two of these were later dropped because they represented unusual project losses due to special circumstances and were outliers. Along dimensions we could measure, we found our final sample to be broadly similar to a larger random sample of 405 projects (approximately 25% of the total number of projects) drawn from the contracts library (but for which we lack performance data). For instance, the frequency of four covariates-MEASUREMENT COST, INTERDEPENDENCY, MAINFRAME, and PROGRAMMING-appearing in our sample is not statistically different from their appearance in the broader sample. Other variables did appear with statistically different frequency. For instance, our sample's projects were 10% more likely to have government agencies as the customer, 13% more likely to be outsourced, 8% less likely to face expropriation concerns, 16% less likely to involve Compustar hardware, and 6% less likely to involve client/server technology. The largest difference between our sample and the larger sample is that project size (revenue) is on average about 72% larger for our sample. Thus, our main concern for the generalizability of our findings to the larger sample of contracts is that we may have under-sampled projects that were small in terms of revenue. Nonetheless, the data offer the advantage of detailed description of the project tasks and objectives, and all costs and revenues associated with employees and/or independent contractors for the project.
Revenues are captured from the customer billing and costs are captured from project hours and expenses submitted by employees and contractors. Compustar applies allowances for SG&A and overhead to employee wages, a topic we will return to in the discussion. In addition to the quantitative data provided by the contract and corresponding internal documentation, we interviewed Compustar managers and other personnel involved in IT projects to identify a proxy for measurement cost and to evaluate the appropriateness of our other proxies. Dependent Variables. The dependent variable for our first stage analysis corresponds to the mode of organizing. As one might expect, all projects involved at least some Compustar employees if only to monitor independent contractors; thus, the relevant question is whether or not independent contractors were used to fulfill the project. We define MODE as a binary variable that is coded as one if the project was insourced and zero if an independent contractor was involved in the project.
The dependent variable for our second stage analysis corresponds to a project's profitability. We calculate MARGIN as the profit margin, expressed as percentage, for each project. Since as some projects incurred losses, MARGIN can be negative. By using a profitability measure we implicitly are concerned with the extent to which the following covariates affect both costs and revenue. Independent Variables. We construct three variables to capture transaction attributes corresponding to our theory. We seek to identify where the risk of expropriation is great, the cost to verify project quality is great, and large interdependencies among IT suppliers are present. Compustar personnel were instrumental in the confirming the appropriateness of our proxies and in coding the variables. and inter-rater reliability was over 97%. For example, if a project involves relocating equipment or migrating data then measurement of output is straightforward. However, if the project involves development of a customized application, system design consulting, or other system support services, the quality of the output is much more subjective and only revealed over time.
Since in the context of IT services we assume that interdependencies arise when multiple parties are directly involved in a project, we code INTERDEPENCENCY as one if persons outside the project team are directly involved in the execution of the project and zero otherwise. This information is recorded in the deliverables and responsibilities sections of the contracts. INTERDEPENDENCY is only coded as one if the other party, either another supplier or customer personnel, is listed as being responsible for some portion of the project deliverables. These parties were only included in the deliverables section of the contract if they had a significant role in the project-not just a small piece that did not affect Compustar.
When these attributes take on the value of one, Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3, predict an increased likelihood in insourcing. Hence, the coefficients for these three variables are predicted to be positive in our first stage Probit analysis. In the second stage of our switching regression analysis, Hypothesis 4 predicts that the coefficients for these variables will be negative if the project is outsourced and positive if the project is insourced. The former occurs because contracting difficulties increase the cost of outsourcing. The latter occurs because insourcing is a more costly form of governance when no contracting difficulties are present. When none of the contracting difficulties are present, profits will be greater under outsourcing. However, for projects with contracting difficulties, profits will be higher under insourcing than outsourcing.
Control Variables. While TCE focuses on organizational form and minimizing governance costs, the resource-based view of the firm (RBV) focuses on the role of capabilities as the primary driver of firm performance. Firms are viewed as bundles of unique, difficult to transfer resources and capabilities. Performance is determined by assigning the project to the resource, either internal or external, with the capabilities best matched to that project. Theoretically, the key variable of interest is the capability of the firm to perform a given project relative to the capabilities of prospective independent contractors. If Compustar has a strong internal capability base in a certain area, then projects in that area should be integrated to achieve superior financial performance while projects for which Compustar has a weak internal capability should be outsourced. Controlling for capabilities is particularly important because of their ability to affect revenues or costs in the second stage of the analysis. In determining for which skills Compustar has an advantage, we consider Compustar's traditional expertise because others have shown that skills and other resources for diversification are most successfully employed for activities that are close to the firm's traditional expertise (Silverman, 1996; Teece et al., 1994) .
We control for Compustar's relative skills with four binary variables. HARDWARE is coded one if a Compustar manufactured hardware is involved in the project and zero otherwise. Compustar has an advantage over independent contractors in projects involving its own hardware because Compustar field engineers are trained in maintaining and using the equipment before it is introduced into the marketplace. MAINFRAME is coded as one if the contract involves working on or with a mainframe computer and zero otherwise. In consultation with Compustar personnel and a variety of experts outside Compustar, including end customers, we identified that Compustar has extensive experience with mainframes that gives it a relative advantage over prospective independent contractors. Both HARDWARE and MAINFRAME represent project areas in which Compustar has had traditional expertise and strong capabilities.
Two other variables capture skills for which Compustar has a relative disadvantage compared to potential contractors. PROGRAMMING is coded as one if the primary task for the project is programming and zero otherwise. Compustar has historically been a large hardware-oriented manufacturer that specialized in mainframe computers.
Compustar had little historical competence in programming application software.
CLIENT/SERVER is coded as one if the primary task of the project is to work on distributed client/server technologies and zero otherwise. Since Compustar has historically focused on mainframes, Compustar employees admitted that their skills in this then-emerging market for client/server technology (primarily Unix) were not at the technological frontier. While Compustar's skills were not well developed in these areas, they were able to leverage complementary skills and their reputation as a reliable systems company to secure many projects that required these skills. Several
Compustar managers also noted that they were trying to improve their skills in these areas during the 1990s. While these categories do not include all skill areas that Compustar possesses, Compustar personnel consider them to be the most important capabilities for which capability relative to the industry average can be determined.
We include two additional variables-size of the project and whether or not the customer is a government agency-that might influence organization choice and profitability. LREVENUE is the logarithm of the project's revenue. Large projects are more likely to exceed the capacity of single suppliers and thus require outsourcing.
However, large projects may also be more critical to Compustar, so they may want to staff them with employees. We have no prediction about the relation between size and profitability. GOVERNMENT is coded one if the customer is a government agency otherwise zero. We have no prediction about the effect of GOVERNMENT on organization choice. However, government contracts were viewed by some interviewees as being highly profitable, which, if true, should positively relate to profitability in the second stage of our analysis.
Finally, we include the variable CONSTRAIN in the first stage of our analysis to facilitate econometric identification of the Probit model. CONSTRAIN is a binary variable coded 1 for years 1994 -1996 and otherwise zero. Compustar's managers believed it was capacity constrained during these years. In response, Compustar added personnel in 1997 and 1998 . The managers believed that this constraint may have influenced organizational choice during 1994-1996, but had little direct effect on demand it faced or its profitability over the entire time frame studied. CONSTRAIN is expected to increase the use of independent contractors but have no effect on profitability. CONSTRAIN captures a period during which demand was high, so revenues would be expected to rise, but the firm was capacity constrained, so they had to pay more to keep employees and access independent contractors. Thus, we include it in our Probit analysis and omit it in the second stage analysis. All other variables could affect both organization choice and profitability and thus must be included in both stages of our analysis. Descriptions of all variables are summarized in Table 1 along with predictions for the first and second stages of our analysis. Table 2 contains descriptive statistics for all variables.
Correlations are low to moderate with none exceeding 0.426, which suggests that multicollinearity is not problematic for our estimation. Compustar's likelihood to outsource projects when these capabilities are needed.
RESULTS
Model 2 reports our complete Probit specification with control variables and our three independent variables. Model 2 provides a statistically significant improvement over Model 1 (χ 2 = 15.10 ** ). Moreover, Model 2's pseudo R 2 increases to 0.357 and it correctly predicts insourcing for 80.05% of our observations, which is a substantial increase over Model 1. The signs and magnitude of the control variables remain broadly similar so we focus discussion on our independent variables. The coefficient for EXPROPRIATION is positive and significant (p < 0.05), which provides support for the hypothesis that appropriability concerns increase the likelihood of insourcing. The coefficient for MEASUREMENT COST is positive and significant (p < 0.01), which provides support for the hypothesis that measurement cost difficulty increases the likelihood of insourcing. Finally, the coefficient for INTERDEPENDENCY is positive and significant (p < 0.05), which provides support for the hypothesis that interdependencies increase the likelihood of insourcing. To better assess the impact of these coefficients we calculate the marginal probability for each hypothesis variable by changing its value from zero to one while holding all other covariates at their means. The marginal probability for EXPROPRIATION, MEASUREMENT COST, and INTERDEPENDENCY is 0.213, 0.323, and 0.315, respectively. Moreover, the marginal probability of integration when going from all exchange conditions equal to zero to all equal to one, is 0.583. These marginal probabilities are substantial and thus demonstrate a strong effect of our hypothesized variables on organizational choice.
We now move to the second stage of the switching regression model. Model 3 in Table   3 reports the coefficient estimates for the effect of our covariates on profitability for those projects outsourced. The overall model is weakly significant (F = 1.81, p < 0.10) and has an R 2 of 0.247. Of our control variables, only the coefficient for GOVERNMENT is significant (p < 0.01). The coefficient is positive, which indicates that profitability increases when independent contractors are utilized on projects for government agencies. We also note that our inverse Mills ratio is weakly significant, which provides support for our empirical modeling approach. The positive sign of the inverse Mills ratio also indicates positive selection, which indicates that the performance of outsourced projects would have been worse if they instead had been insourced (for a discussion, see Hamilton and Nickerson, 2003) .
The coefficient for EXPROPRIATION is negative and weakly significant (p < 0.10), which indicates that the profitability of outsourced projects declines when expropriation concerns are present. The coefficient for MEASUREMENT COST is negative and significant (p < 0.05), which indicates that the profitability of outsourced projects declines when measurement-cost concerns are present. Finally, the coefficient for INTERDEPENDENCY is negative but just misses statistical significance. This insignificance may be due to the fact that only one project that is outsourced was evaluated as having interdependencies (and it also had measurement cost difficulties).
The signs of these three coefficients are consistent with Hypothesis 4, and our tests of statistical significance provide support for the predicted effect of the first two independent variables.
Model 3 in Table 3 reports the coefficient estimates for the effect of our covariates on profitability for those projects organized as insourced. The overall model is significant (F = 2.20, p < 0.05) and has an R 2 of 0.094. As with our prior results, only the coefficient for GOVERNMENT is significant (p < 0.01); however, in contrast to our prior finding, the coefficient is negative indicating that profitability decreases when government projects are insourced. Our inverse Mills ratio is not significant.
Nonetheless, the negative sign of the inverse Mills ratio indicates that the performance of insourced projects would have been worse if they instead had been outsourced, which is consistent with our theory. The coefficient for EXPROPRIATION is positive and weakly significant (p < 0.10), which indicates that the profitability of integrated projects increases when expropriation concerns are present. The coefficients for MEASUREMENT COST and INTERDEPENDENCY are positive but highly insignificant.
Although all three coefficients are all of the direction consistent with Hypothesis 4, only the first one is significant.
We now use these findings to comparatively assess profitability between organization modes of outsourcing and insourcing to examine Hypothesis 4. We do this by comparing a randomly chosen project's profit when organized as predicted versus organized opposite to prediction. We do this for each independent variable, which leads to six comparisons. For instance, assume that a randomly selected project corresponds to all covariates at their mean and assume that EXPROPRIATION is 0. By assuming a randomly selected project we do not include the inverse Mills ratio in our estimated.
The inverse Mills ratio must be included when the estimate for a specific project is calculated. Next, we compute and compare profitability under outsourced vs.
insourced. When assessing a single independent variable, the other independent variables, as well as the control variables, are held at their means. The difference between these two profits is the cost of mistakenly organizing as insourced when TCE 
DISCUSSION
Our empirical analysis shows that the choice of employment relation does impact project performance. We show that each type of organization-employees and independent contractors-is best suited to specific situations, which implies that attempts to show in general that the use independent contractors is superior or inferior to employees are unlikely to be successful. Projects with minimal contracting difficulties exhibit superior performance when outsourced, while projects with greater contracting difficulties perform better when insourced.
Our strongest findings come from EXPROPRIATION and MEASUREMENT COST. The project's profit margin drops by 20.8% and 200% for the form and 99.6% and 28.6% for the latter, depending on whether we predict outsourcing or insourcing, when the project's organization is misaligned with project attributes. These results indicate an asymmetry in the penalty for misalignment-it seems that a lack of measurement difficulty strongly favors independent contractors whereas the presence of expropriation concerns strongly favors employees. The significant penalty for outsourcing in the presence of the firm's proprietary technology is consistent with the importance of protecting proprietary technology in this industry and with the cost of training independent contractors to use the firm's technology. Likewise, the penalty for insourcing when measurement costs are lacking shows the power of pecuniary incentives, as when independent contractors work hard to try make a favorable impression and increase their chances of repeat business.
In contrast, the penalties for poor organizational choice for INTERDEPENDENCY are small-10.8% and 17.1%-and based on parameter estimates that are not significant.
Further investigation revealed that INTERDEPENDENCY nearly perfectly predicts integration-that is, only one project that had interdependencies was outsourced.
Because of this limited variation, our econometric model cannot provide accurate estimates of this effect of misalignment on profitability. This finding might suggest that the problems associated with interdependencies were relatively easy for Compustar to identify and choose an organization mode that mitigated the contracting difficulty. To do so, however, we would expect the cost of selecting the non-economizing organizational form to be substantial, unlike the costs we estimate above. We conjecture that when projects are vying for scarce internal resources, Compustar prefers to allocate employees to projects that are interdependent because of the direct reputational problems that can result from using independent contractors for these projects. While it may not be ideal to use independent contractors when there is a measurement problem or when the firm's proprietary technology is involved, Compustar believes that additional monitoring, though costly, should ensure that the project is completed in a satisfactory manner.
These results indicate the strategic importance of getting governance right. Tradeoffs will have to be made given that the firm lacks sufficient employees to insource all projects with some level of contracting difficulty and firms that know what types of misalignment are least costly will have an advantage over competitors.
A useful comparison to our estimates is provided by Masten et al. (1991) The impact of expropriation concerns, measurements cost, and to a lesser degree interdependence, show that knowledge-based industries such as IT services can still be examined to advantage using transaction cost logic. However, the transaction attributes that lead to contracting difficulties are related to technology and complexity more than specific physical assets. Thus the underlying transaction cost logic of insourcing in the presence of contracting difficulties is confirmed in the IT industry, but specific mechanisms that drive insourcing need to be examined at the industry level.
Coefficient estimates of our control variables also offer some interesting insights. Three of the four capability variables were significant in our Probit analysis and thus influenced organization choice. As expected, Compustar was more likely to internally undertake projects that involved a mainframe. It is knowledge about mainframes where
Compustar has a relative advantage over prospective independent contractors. The converse was the case for CLIENT/SERVER and PROGRAMMING: Compustar was more likely to outsource projects that required these skills. While these estimates provide some support for the resource-based view of the firm with respect to choice of organization, we note that none of the relative resource variables affected profitability.
Two factors may account for this. There is significant competition for all projects, including those involving Compustar's strengths, which may compete away above normal returns based on capabilities. Similarly, competition among independent contractors may be sufficiently intense such that resource-based advantages do not yield above normal returns for contracts (and hence costs for Compustar). Alternatively, Mata, Fuerst and Barney (1995) separate the impact of managerial and technological capabilities in IT. Our largely insignificant results for the measures of technical capabilities on profitability may implicate managerial capability-a capability for which we had no measure-as effecting profitability of IT services. Even when utilizing an independent contractor, a Compustar project manager oversees the project and interacts with the customer. It may be that some managers are better than others for managing certain types of projects, regardless of whether independent contractors or internal resources are employed. Additional data is needed to examine this dimension of the resource-based explanation of firm performance. The need for additional data notwithstanding, our approach responds to Williamson's (1999) call for investigating the organization of particular exchanges in which a firm's strengths and weaknesses are considered.
Our study suffers from several limitations. First, our data comes from a single firm, which limits the generalizability of our results. However, testing hypotheses at the level of the transaction requires detailed data, which makes data collection from multiple firms very costly. Only by replicating research of this type in a variety of settings can scholars have confidence that our empirical results apply more broadly. Our study begins to do so by building on Masten et al. (1991) . Second, the number of observations in our study is relatively small, which may limit the reliability of our estimates. Nonetheless, the number of observations is larger than most other studies in this research program. For example, Masten et al. (1991) based their analysis on only 73 observations. Third, our estimates depend critically on Compustar's reporting of internal costs. Their internal accounting and overhead allocation may lead to incorrect estimates if the GAAP procedures they follow are systematically different from economic costs. However, in our interviews with Compustar managers we found no indication that Compustar's internal costs were systematically different from the cost information we would have collected if we could have done so. Finally, we note that while our empirical model explains well the sourcing decision, our model does less well at explaining variation in profitability, especially for insourcing. As mentioned above, we did not examine managerial capability as a potential explanation for such variation, which is an area that Compustar personnel indicated might provide some explanatory power. However, this omission does not bias or undermine our results; instead, it suggests an additional avenue for research.
Even with these limitations, this paper has useful implications for management. Our analysis indicates that organizational form, even at the project level, matters for profitability. Managers are well advised to understand the potential sources of contracting difficulties, which may vary with industry and customer needs, and choose organizational forms to mitigate these difficulties. Indeed, the industrial context of our study suggests that such organizational concerns are not just relevant for lowtechnology industry, such as ship building, but also relevant for a high-technology industry such as IT services. 
